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REVENUE SHARING AND THE NEW FEDERALISM 
Murray L. Weidenbaum 
(Editors Note: The following are excerpts of a paper 
presented at the Revenue Sharing Symposium, Univer-
sity of Nebraska at Omaha, December 7, 1973. The 
author is Mallincllrodt Distinguished University Prof-
essor, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. Dr. 
Weidenbaum is former Secretary of the Treasury for 
Economic Policy in the Nixon Administration and 
chairman of the Administrations Committee on Rev-
enue Sharing.) 
Introduction: The Basic Purpose 
While I was chairman of the Administration's Committee 
on Revenue Sharing and attempting to develop support for the 
program, I made literall y hundreds of presentations to state and 
local government officials and civic groups throughout the nation. 
Let me read a short excerpt of the standard part of every talk I 
gave, whether it was to a professional group of economists or to 
a local Rotary: 
"Before getting into the details, one fundamental 
point needs to be made. We are not recommending just 
another program of sending Federal dollars around the 
country; there certainly is not shortage of ways of doing 
that already. 
"We are proposing a shift of decision-making power 
to state and local governments. Revenue sharing is unlike 
any existing grant-in-aid program. Under revenue sharing, 
the money that state and local governments obtain from 
the U.S. Treasury becomes in good measure their money. 
For example, revenue sharing money can go into a county's 
general fund, and it is up to the county council to decide 
how to spend it." 
Historical Perspective: Republican Version 
The general concept of revenue sharing, that is, sharing the 
revenues of the federal government with the other parts of the 
federal system, goes back to the earliest days of the Republic. 
In his second inaugural address in 1805, President Thomas 
Jefferson urged that federal revenue be utilized for a "just repart-
ition ... among the States ... applied ... to rivers, canals, roads, arts, 
manufactures, education, and other great objects within each 
state." 
In 1836 the Congress actually did endorse a form of 
revenue sharing when it voted to distribute surplus federal funds 
to state governments. The amount actually distributed in 1837 
was almost equal to the total of direct federal expenditures for 
the year. That magnificent sum of $28 million was used for 
a variety of purposes, ranging from capitalizing the state banks 
to local debt repayment to public works construction. The 
greater part of the distribution was devoted to what we now 
call investments in human resources, notabl y education. 
Modern day interest in unconditional sharing of federal 
tax revenues with the states can be t raced to the early 1950's 
when the concept began to emerge again in academic ci rcles. 
Soon, political leaders were giving it their attention as well. 
In 1958, then Congressman Melvin Laird introduced a revenue 
sharing bill. Much of the credit for bringing the concept to 
more widespread public attention is owed to Professor Walter 
Heller of the University of Minnesota who, while Chairman of 
the President's Council of Economic Advisers in the early 1960's, 
proposed a detailed revenue sharing plan. The plan was developed 
in cooperation with Dr. Joseph Pechman of the Brookings 
Institution, who headed a task force to develop more fully the 
specific outlines of a proposal. The result was often called the 
Heller-Pechman Plan. 
The Heller-Pechman Plan was never proposed by the 
Johnson Administration. Yet interest in the idea cont inued. 
By 1968, su pport had grown to the point that both party plat-
forms contained specific revenue shari ng proposals. During the 
campaign, candidate Richard Nixon pledged, "I plan a stream-
lined Federal system with a return to the states, cities, and 
communi ties of decision-making powers rightfu lly theirs." 1 n 
Apri l 1969, while outlining h is first legislative program, President 
Richard Nixon called for " ... a start on sharing the revenues of the 
Federal Government, so that other levels of govern ment...will 
not be caught in a constant fiscal cri sis." You wil l note a duality 
of justifications which continues to this day: the political science 
concern with the decentralization of governmental power, and 
the closely related concern of the economists over the adequacy 
of the financial base for state and local government. 
The next important step occurred in July 1969. The 
President ca lled to the White House a representative and bi-
partisan grou p of Governors, Mayors, and county offi cals to 
assist the Admini stration in developing a spec ific approach to 
revenue sharing. We reached agreement on the basic principles: 
1. An automatic distri bution each year of a designated 
portion of the federal income tax base, based on objective 
criteria spel led out in law. 
2. An equ itabl e sharing of the money among State and 
local governments, also spelled out in clear formulas contained 
in federal law. 
3. "No strings" or restrictio ns on the use of the money . 
4. Incl usion of all general-purpose local governments, 
regardless of size or locat ion . 
The four th point represented new ground in the develop-
ment of revenue sharing--the inclusion of counties, cities, towns 
and other "general-purpose" loca l governmen ts. Most of the 
earlier approaches were I imited to state governments. The July 
1969 agreement was a fundamen tal political compromise between 
the respective demands of states and local ities. Their joining 
forces on the subject of revenue sharing was to provide the 
essential political support during the protracted congressional 
considerations of revenue sharing legislation. 
In September 1969, the Administration's first revenue 
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sharing bill was introduced in the Congress. In the Senate, the 
bill was sponsored by Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee 
in behalf of h imself and 32 of his colleagues. In the House of 
Representatives, it was introduced by Representative Jackson 
Betts of Ohio and 75 of his colleagues. Despite the relatively 
large number of sponsors and the growing public support, the 
Congressional committees to which the bil ls were introduced 
held no hearings on them. That the public support was sub-
stantial and growing was evident. In May 1969, the Gallup 
Poll showed 71 percent in favor of having a percentage of 
federal income taxes returned to state and local governments 
for use as they saw fit. A Gallop survey conducted in January 
1971 found that support had grown to 77 percent. Favorable 
reaction cut across party lines, with large majorities of Demo-
crats {77 percent), Republicans {81 percent), and Independents 
{73 percent) al l in favor of the plan. 
In February 1971, Senator Baker and 38 cosponsors 
introduced the General Revenue Sharing Act of 1971. The 
House version was introduced by Congressman Betts and 
140 cosponsors. We had worked out the details of the new 
and more generous proposal carefully with representatives 
of the major national associations of State and local officials, 
includ ing the National Governors Conference, the National 
Legislative Conference, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the 
National League of Cities, the National Association of Count ies 
' 
and the International City Management Association. 
The precise formulas contained in the 1969 bills were 
modified to provide a larger share to local governments, approx-
imately one-half. The general "no str ings" approach was contin-
ued. Despite forecasts that Congressional hearings would merely 
"kill" the revenue sharing idea, the extensive hearings held in 
1971 by the Ways and Means Committee of the House of 
Representatives revealed the very strong support for the prop-
osal. Several important modifications were made in the course 
of the extended Congressional deliberations. 
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Impact of Congressional Changes 
A further increase was made in the local share to two-
thirds of the total. In view of the greatly improved financial 
conditions of state governments during the last few years, that 
seems to have been a desirable change. Yet, the revised geo-
graphic distribution formulas represent more change than imp-
rovement. The Administration's proposal went to great pains 
to take into accou nt the great diversity among the sta tes. That 
is, in some states--notably Hawai i--the state government bears 
the burden of financing and carrying out the great bul k of the 
government functions, ranging from welfare to education. 
Under the original approach, such a state government 
would receive an above-average share of the funds goi ng to the 
state--far more than one-third. In contrast, in a state such as 
New York--where local governments carry out a much larger 
range of government functions, including welfare and education 
--the state governmen ts would receive a below-average share of 
the revenue sharing funds distributed to that state. By ignoring 
the wide variations in the allocation of responsibilities between 
individual states and their local sectors, the congressional version 
of revenue sharing loses a good deal of the equity embodied in 
the earlier version. 
A five-year f ixed dollar amount was substituted for the 
earl ier plan to disburse permanently and automatically a pre-
designated share of the personal income tax base. During 
a five-year period, the Congress should have adequate oppor-
tunity to review the wisdom of its actions. Also, it was argued 
that such a reasonably long period--in contrast to the typical 
12-month appropriation enacted by the Congress--would enable 
the state and local governments to make re latively long-term 
plans for the use of the revenue sharing funds. Because the 
legislation is both an authorization and appropriation act, 
it provides considerabl y more assurance to the recipients than 
the annuall y-appropriated grant-in-aid. 
It does seem, however, that the five-year limitation has 
restrained localities in making their allocation of funds. A 
recent survey of Southwestern states, for example, reveals 
that a large portion of the local funds is being used for capital 
projects. Apparently, localities are reluctant to incorporate the 
revenue sharing fu nds into their operating budgets because of 
thei r uncertainty over the continuation of the program beyond 
1976. 
A survey of local officials in the spring of 1973 by the 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations revealed 
a similar pattern of response. One question that they asked was, 
"Did uncertainty about the future of revenue sharing have an 
important bearing on the way your government decided to 
spend its revenue sharing fu nds?" Approximately half of the 
local officials replying stated that the uncertainty did have 
an important bearing on the way in which they spent the money. 
This is borne out by a follow-up question as to whether the 
uncertainty influenced the local offi~ i a ls to use the money for 
capital outlays and o ther non-recurring expenses. The answer 
in this case was overwhelmingly, "yes". 
Perhaps the most unfortunate change is the requirement 
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that the local share only be used for designated "priority" areas, 
which notably exclude welfare and education. The areas 
"blessed" by the Congress comprise public safety, envi ronmental 
protection, public transportation, health, recreation, libraries, 
social services, and capital outlays. That change is undesirable 
on both conceptual and practical grounds. Conceptually, such 
program "strings" violate the basic notion of putting the 
responsibi li ty for allocating and spending the funds right on the 
local governments receiving the money. If the citizens do not 
like how the revenue sharing money is being spent, they know 
exactly who to blame and hold accountable--and defeat, if they 
wish, at the next election. 
At the practical level, limi ting the local two-thirds of the 
revenue sharing money to specific priority areas, no matter 
how worthy those areas may be, multiplies the unproductive 
overhead and paper shuffling that revenue sharing is designed 
to cut down. Each local ity is having to set up an accounting 
system to show the inevitable federal auditors that the revenue 
sharing money is being spent for parks or sewers or some other 
designated local activity that the national legislature has ruled 
to be a priority in every locality. Woe unto the unfortunate 
local government who is caught using a penny of the money for 
what by defau lt Congress must consider low priorities of local 
government--such as the pub I ic schools. 
What Revenue Sharing May Accompli sh 
As it has been just about one year since the fi rst revenue 
sharing paymen ts were made, it obviously is premature to 
attempt any definitive evaluation of the program. Nevertheless, 
I would like to speculate as to the more likely results. 
First and most obvious, revenue sharing can be expected to 
foster the attainment of its basic objective, to increase the 
relative importance of the state and local portion of the public 
sector of the Un ited States at the expense of the federal. In the 
words of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations, the legislation provides "a very definite tilt" in the 
balance of fiscal federa lism, away from centralized policy 
making and toward matching needs and resources at the State 
and local levels. 
To some degree--the state-of-the-art does not enable us 
to calibrate it precisely--direct federal employment, purchases, 
and other outlays will be less than they likely would have been 
in the absence of revenue sharing. Conversely, the em ployment, 
procurements, and other expenditures by state and local govern-
ments will be larger than they otherwise wou let have been. 
And the greater relative importance of state and local govern-
ment wi ll have occurred in a qualitative as well as quantitative 
sense. More of those expenditure deci sions will be made by 
state and local officials rather than by the Congress in voting 
grants-in-aid or by federa l personnel admin istering the aid 
programs. 
To a modest extent, some of the smaller and middle-size 
local governments will obtain a more equitable share of the 
total amount of federa l financial assistance ava ilab le to state 
and local governments. This will be particularly true for those 
now lacking staffs wise in the ways of federal government 
"grantsmanship," bu t who wi ll receive their revenue sharing 
all otments automatically. 
A sizeable proportion of communr tres with populations 
between 10,000 and 20,000 report that they have never even 
applied for federal aid and that the deta iled informati on 
requi red in making appl ication for many programs has deterred 
them. Even some of the larger ci ties say they have given up 
applying for relatively small grants because of the great paper-
work burden. 
On balance, it can be an ti cipated that the total fl ow of 
federal di sbursemen ts to state and local governments will be 
greater than they o therwise would have been. That is, even 
though some of revenue sharing may be at the expense of 
foregoing a greater increase in grants-in-aid than we would 
otherwise witness, much of the "opportunity cost" of revenue 
sharing will be a slower growth than otherwise would be the 
case in other federal programs. Hence, the net effect of general 
revenue sharing wil l be to ex pand state and local revenues. 
We should note, however, that 1972 was the second year 
in a row that there was virtuall y zero population growth in the 
number of federal categorical aids. Several factors were at 
work, including Presidential vetoes, the enactment of general 
revenue sharing, and a general ly unfavorable climate for new 
government spending programs. 
In do llar terms, federal disbursemen ts for grants-in-aid 
merely showed a slowing of what has been a remarkabl y rapid 
growth trend in the last fe w years. From a total of $36 billion 
in the fiscal year 1972, these outlays rose to $38 bil lion in fiscal 
1974. There is no assurance that these levels wi ll be achieved--
but the talk of wholesale slashes and cutbacks just is not 
evident in the available numbers. It should readily be admitted, 
however, that the current data in the national inco me accounts 
are quite confusing. Attention has been focusing on the reported 
decline in to tal federal grants- in-aid (including revenue sharing) 
from $46 billion in the fourth quarter of 1972 to a rate of $41 
billion in the first half of 1973. The decline is simply the effect 
of paying out all of the 1972 contribution for general revenue 
sharing late last year and early this year. The annual data clearly 
reveal the upward pattern of federal aid, from $24 billion in 
1970 to $38 bi llion in 1972 and to the $41 billion rate th us 
far this year. 
Almost paradoxically, the total public sector is likely to be 
smaller as the result of revenue sharing than it would have been 
in its absence. The state will not wither away, nor even will total 
government spend ing (by all levels of government in the United 
States) decline. Rather, the growth will be smaller than would 
otherwise be the case. The reason for this is that, indirectly, 
some of the revenue sharing money will be used for reducing 
state or local taxes or more likely to slow down what has been 
the very rapid growth of these tax sources. One recent study 
estimates that, on the average, annual fl ow of $5.5 bill ion of 
general revenue sharing wil l result in increased state and local 
expen ditures of about $2-3 billion. The remainder is li kely to 
be devoted to tax reduction. 
To an economist, a key technical di fference between 
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grants-in-aid and general revenue sharing is that the former works 
through both the "income" and the " price" effects, whi le the 
latter works only through the " income" effects. That means that 
grants- in-aid provide a double incentive to increase spending by 
state and local governments. First and similar to revenue shari ng, 
they increase the revenues or income of these governmental 
units, thus enabling them to spend more. But grants-in-aid have a 
second effect--they lower the price of certain categories of public 
goods. 
For example, a 50-50 match ing gran t on a $5 mi ll ion 
li brary means that it on ly costs the county or city $2~ mill ion 
to build the library. At the lower price, the demand is higher. 
Few can resist the argument that our city will " lose" the fed-
eral money if we do not match it. Not only is the local "price" 
of the aided public goods thus reduced in relation to other public 
undertakings, but in relation to private goods. Thus, grants-in-
aid tend to encourage a greater amount of purchases of public 
goods (and hence a larger publi c sector) by altering the relative 
prices of pu bli c goods vis-a-vis private goods. 
Revenue sharing does not have that "price" effect. If a 
county wan ts to bui ld a $5 mil lion library, it will have to pay 
the ful l $5 mil lion. Even if the $5 million is all taken out of 
the revenue sharing fun d, there wil l be ful l citizen knowledge 
that the money could have been used for another purpose, and 
perhaps foregoing the need for a tax increase. 
Also, gran ts-in-aid--again unlike revenue sharing--tend to 
encourage wasteful or low yield undertaki ngs, because of the 
federal matching money. In this day of cun<.:~rn with benefit/ 
cost analysis, let us assume a program whose benefits to society 
are less than the costs to society--say benefits to $800 and costs 
of $1,000, with a benefit/cost ratio of 0.8. Should such a project 
be undertaken? 
The real istic answer is that it depends--i t depends on who 
gets the benefits and who pays the costs, and of cou rse on who 
makes the decisions. If in our hypothetical example, there is a 
50 percent matching grant available from a federal agency, the 
locali ty may fi nd that the pertinent benefit/cost ra tio for it is 
quite different. If the locality will stand to gain the $800 in 
benefits but only have to pay one-half of the $1,000 of costs, 
the pertinent benefit/cost ratio for local decision-makers is not 
an unfavorable 0.8 bu t a rather attractive 1.6 ($800 of benefits 
to $500 of local costs). It is not surprising, hence, that local 
interests continue to push so strongly for federal projects in 
their area, even quite marginal ones, so long as the national 
taxpayer will subsidize them. Again, revenue sharing is an 
attractive alternative to that unhappy state of affai rs. 
It should be noted that the recent discussion of state and 
local surpluses seems to have been overblown. Over half of the 
surplus in 1972 was earned by state and local retirement funds, 
money which is not available for general expenditures. The cycl-
ical recovery in the national economy and the initial large retro-
active payment of revenue sharing help to explain the remainder. 
In time t hese temporary surpl uses are likely to be reduced 
in favor of a combination of higher state and local di sbursemen ts 
and lower taxes. Fundamentally, the question is whether the 
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society prefers its tax reductions and expenditure increases to 
occur at the state and local or the national level. 
Perhaps one of the most important impac ts of revenue 
sharing wi ll be the influence on the structure of dec is ion-mak ing 
in state and local govern ment, especially to strengthen the posit-
ion of elected officials. Under the grant-in-aid system, typically 
the program department of the state, city, or county looks to 
its counterpart in the federal bureaucracy for guidance and 
leadership. Where the federal agency provides the larger share 
of the funds, such federal influence or contro l may be very 
substantial. 
Thus, in effect, a state Roads Commission may find itself 
more beholden to the Federal Bureau of Public Roads--from 
which it receives 90 percent of the cost of interstate highways--
than to the governor or state legislature, wh ich provide the 
remain ing 10 percent. To a lesser extent, similar relationships 
exist between state education departments and the U.S. Office 
of Education, between local health offices and the U.S. Public 
Health Service, an d so forth. 
The revenue shari ng funds, in contrast, are administered 
by popularly elected officials. It is the legislature that will decide 
the uses to which the state government's share will be put. 
Similarly, the city councils and the county commissioners will 
exercise the decision-making power over the local shares. Thus, 
an important shift of power from executive to legislative 
branches may well occur, parallel ing the shift from federal to 
state-local decision-making. 
To the extent that more of the decision-making and hence 
action is shifted to the states and their subdivisions, they will be 
more capable of attracting high calibre personnel and thus 
become more effective at carrying out their functions and pro-
grams. The greater financial resources should help in both recruit-
ment and retention of good people. I believe that we have seen 
our most talented students interested in government service all 
go to Washington. State or local government was generally dis-
missed as irrelevant. Revenue sharing will be no panacea, but 
it should help to improve the situation. 
A related impact is the incentive for special-purpose 
districts--which have continued to proliferate--to merge into 
general-purpose units. This incentive is provided by limiting local 
revenue shar ing payments to counties, cities, towns, and other 
general-purpose governments. Because the allocation of funds is 
based in part on tax effort, counties and cities will benefit by 
incorporating special districts, whenever they can. Reducing 
the number of overlapping jurisdictions would be a significant 
reform of local government. 
Inciden tl y, the result of the federal auditing requirement 
may well be to strengthen financial and program administration 
at state and local levels. The general revenue sharing law provides 
that the Secretary of the Treasury r.1ay accept the audits per-
formed by state and local governments of the revenue sharing 
funds that they receive if they are considered sufficiently reliable. 
The Treasury Department has indicated that it will rely on an 
audit section of some 20 to 25 people. Such a small force will 
onl y be able to perform spot checks on a sample of the recipient 
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local governments. 
A major complication in analyzing the effects of revenue 
sharing is the fact that man y other changes may be occurring 
in federa l programs at the same time. For example, a re lated 
aspect of the Nixon Administration's New Federalism is an effort 
to consolidate many of the specific categorical aids to state and 
local government into fewer and broader grants, also eliminating 
matching requirements in most of those cases. 
Unfortunately, the administration has labeled this effort 
"special revenue sharing." It is, however, separate and d is tinct 
from general revenue sharing. Many supporters of the revenue 
sharing concept do not agree with elim inating the ind ividual 
grants-in-aid--such as model cities and urban renewal--which have 
been iden tified with the Great Society and earlier Democratic 
Administrations. Some of them believe that state and local gov-
ernments will be less responsive to the needs of minority groups 
and the poor. In any event, it is not necessary to endorse, or to 
reject, the so-called special revenue sharing proposals in order 
to view general revenue sharing sympathetically. There is a par-
allel here with earl ier efforts to link general revenue sharing with 
the adoption of a value added tax. For a variety of reasons, the 
proposed link between the two was never formally established--
even· at the proposal stage. 
Through its special revenue shari ng proposals, the Nixon 
Administration wou ld replace 70 categorica l programs with 
four special revenue sharing funds: urban commun ity devel-
opment, education, manpower training, and law enforcement. 
Budget authority for the first full year of operation is estimated 
at $7 bi llion. Hence, the great bulk of existing grants-in-aid--
which are being funded at an annual rate of about $39 billion 
--presumably would remain undisturbed. 
Other efforts re lated to revenue sharing include the Admin-
istration's attempts to streamline the administration of federal 
programs by consol idating many of the old- line special-interest 
departments into four new ones organized around four major 
domestic purposes of government: community development, 
human resources, natural resources, and economic development. 
Thus far, the Congress has not approved either the special 
revenue sharing proposals or the plans to merge the cabinet 
departments. 
Instead, the area of major debate appears to have shifted, 
at least for the time being, to the question of economy in govern-
ment. The most dramatic aspect of the new struggle is the 
subject of Presidential impoundments ::>f Congressional appro-
priations. Many Presidents have refused to spend all the funds 
that Congress has voted and there is some legislative authority 
for exercising such discretion. Nevertheless, the scale of the 
impoundments has been exceptionally large and the public 
statements accompanying them unnecessarily challenging to 
congressional prerogatives. 
Although the impoundments have upset the supporters of 
the programs affected, the entire action properly should be 
viewed as an aspect of fiscal policy. In this period of substantial 
inflationary pressures, restraint on government spending seems 
to be an appropriate response. Inevitably, opinions will differ 
on which programs shou ld be cut back, out that is the cont inu al 
struggle over national priorities. It is unforunate that the debate 
has clouded the introduction of general revenue sharing. But as 
stated earlier, over the years the operation of revenue sharing 
is li kely to mean a slower rate of growth in other federal spend-
ing than would otherwise be the case. And despite the ta lk abou t 
slashes in civilian programs, the reality is only a modest slow-
down in what has been an extremely rapid rate of growth. 
A Look Ahead 
The modern public sector which is emerging in advanced 
nations requires a variety of mechanisms and organizations in 
order to carry out national po licies. Excessive reliance on any 
single mechanism--whether it be contracts to government-orien-
ted corporations or grants-in-aid to state and local government 
--often tends to weaken the mechanism or to dilute the effect-
iveness of public policy. Seen in this light, revenue sharing is 
a useful addition to the mechanisms which the modern state, 
particularly a federal one, can uti li ze in conducting the public 
business. 
Whether revenue sharing is a one-time experiment or a 
continuing commitment will depend, in very large measure, on 
how the nation evaluates the effectiveness of the revenu e 
sharing money in comparison with the other mechanisms 
avai lable for disbursing federal funds and helping to achieve 
national objectives. Thus, ultimately, the success of the program 
will depend on the wisdom of program choices and on the 
effectiveness of program execution on the part of the states and 
local ities using the money. 
Although it can be hoped that the exampl es will be few 
and minor, from t ime to time there wi ll bound to be reports 
of some stupid or wastefu l instances in the use of revenue 
sharing money and perhaps even some real "horror stories " of 
actual graft and corruption. Unfortunately, honesty and good 
judgment cannot be legislated--and that has been so amply and 
recently demonstrated at all levels of government and in both 
the public and private sectors. 
To be sure, it is encumbent upon state and local officials 
to avoid what has been ca lled "FTC expenditure"--funds going 
for f rivol ity, thievery, and chicanery. But it will take more than 
that to make the revenue sharing experiment a success. It wi ll 
be necessary to show the citizenry that the $30 bill ion of 
federal tax revenue that wi ll be allocated to state and local gov-
ernments over the five-year period, by and large, will be more 
wisely spent than if the su ms were merely added to the budgets 
of federal agencies. That is clearly a challenge to the abili ty of 
state, city, and county government throughou t the nation and 
it is likely to require some positive action. The state of Texas is 
an example of one of the few areas that is developing a compre-
hensive approach to th is important question. 
In late 1972 Texas established a Revenue Sharing Counci l 
to promote state and local cooperation in the revenue shari ng 
program. The Governor serves as chairman of the Council ; the 
other members are three city officials, three county officials, 
the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, and the State Comptroller. 
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The Council does not have the authority to allocate the 
revenue sharing money. Rather, it is assisting those who do. 
Early in its operations, the Council requested the State Depart-
ment of Community Affairs to set in motion a program to assist 
local governments in providing statistical information to federal 
agencies as well as in answering the inevitable questions that are 
li kely to arise. The result is a State Office of Revenue Sharing 
Assistance. 
As the Executive Director of the Texas ACI R put it, "We 
want very much to avoid a stream of Texas officials going to 
Washington seeking answers, because the more questions we ask 
of Washington, the more written responses they will give, many 
of which will find their way into the Federal guidelines." 
The Texas approach may not be necessarily desirable or 
wor ~ab l e in other regions. But, in general, the "extra mile" that 
state and local official s may walk in carrying out the spirit as 
well as the letter of revenue sharing is likely to be a very good 
investment. It should be recalled that many members of the 
Congress had and continue to hold an agnostic view of the desir-
abi lity of yie ldi ng the responsibility over the disbursement of a 
portion--albeit a modest part--of federal revenues to another level 
of government. Hence efforts to reduce the flexibility and discre-
tion available to state and local officials in carrying out the 
revenue sharing experiment can be expected from time to time. 
The legislation itself contains restrictions that do viol ence to the 
basic concept, notably the limitation of local expenditures to 
designated priority areas. The U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations anticipates that the Appropriations 
Committees will make another effort to convert revenue sharing 
to an annual basis, thus eliminating the five-year assurance. 
To put it simply but accurate ly, unless sta te and local gov-
ernments, and their citizens, and their associations, take great 
pains to minimize waste and inefficiency in the revenue sharing 
disbursements, more rather than fewer restrictions can be 
expected to be written into the legisla tion in the future. Despite 
impressions to the contrary, the Congress has been known to cut 
back and on occasion even to eliminate federal spending 
programs that lose public support. 
But I want to end on an optimistic note. For th~ next 
five years, the Nation will be witnessing not on ly the di sburse-
m~nt of $30 billion, but also one of the most important efforts 
to strengthen the institut ions of the American society. If there 
is any lesson to be learned from the past, including the very 
recent past, it is the need for a free and strong nation to have 
a variety of centers of power, resources, and discretion in the 
formu lation and execution of public policy. Revenue Sharing 
may well turn out to be a vital contributor to the development 
of that more decentralized structure of the public sector which 
will enable our society to continue to cope with a great variety 
of external pressures and domestic stresses. Revenue sharing is, 
after all, one of the few programs in American history which is 
overtly designed to he I p achieve the often neglected portion of 
the preamble to the Constitution--the stirring part referring to 
"forming a more perfect Union." 
REVENUE SHARING: SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION IN OMAHA 1 
Ralph H. Todd 
The findings of this paper were presented at the Revenue Sharing Symposium 
at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, December 8, 1973. 
Introduction 
The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 pro-
vides the means to return $30.2 billion of federal fu nds to state 
and local governments. It is estimated that the City of Omaha 
will receive $25 million of these funds during the five year 
program. There are few strings attached to the use of such funds, 
however, local governments must spend the allocations within 
designated priority expenditure categories. These categories are 
public transportation, public safety, environmental protection, 
recreation, libraries, social services for the aged and poor, finan-
cial administration, and ordinary and necessary capital expendi-
tures. 
To determine what people of Omaha feel to be the expend-
iture category with the highest priority, a community wide 
survey was carried out by the Center during the period Novem-
ber 26, to December 5, 1 <J73 . l{esponses were obtained from 744 
men and women via telephone interviews. Random sampling 
techniques were used in the design and execution of the sample 
survey. 
Major Findings 
Data from the survey were tabulated on an aggregated 
basis as we ll as by age, sex, educat ion, income and area of resi-
dence. The following conclusions were drawn: (1) The major-
ity of Omahans (81 percent) approved of the revenue sharing 
program. (2) Omahans think public transportation, public safety, 
and social services for the aged and poor were the most impor-
tant expenditure categories. (3) Financial administration, lib-
raries and recreation were considered least important. (4) On the 
basis of statistical tests, no significant differences were fo und 
among the three most important expenditure categories) (5) 
Similarly, no signi ficant differences were fou nd in terms of the 
ranking of the most important expenditure category by age, sex, 
and area of residence. However, significant differences were 
fo und by income and education.3 Rankings by total response 
and by income and education are given in Table 1. 
TAB LE 1 
THE MOST IMPORTANT EXPENDITURE CAT EGOR Y OF GENERAL REVENUE SHA RIN G FUNDS 
BY TOTAL SAMPLE, INCOME AND EDUCATI ONAL LEVEL OF RESPONDENT 
Total Sample I nco me Level Educationa l Level 
Under $8,000 $8 .000-$12 ,000 Over $ 12,000 Under 12 Years 12 Years Over 12 Years 
Category* 
Percent Rank Percent Rank Pt!rcent Rank Percent Rank Percent Rank Percent Rank Percent Rank 
Public 
Transportation 26.75 1 25.78 2 26.21 2 29.81 1 20.31 3 23.02 2 32.68 1 
Environment al 
Protecti on 9.01 5 5.26 5 8.47 5 12.45 4 7.03 5 7.91 5 10.47 5 
Pub I ic Safety 26.08 2 23.16 3 30.65 1 23.40 2 21.09 2 32.01 1 23.05 2 
Socia l Services 
for Aged and Poor 22.85 3 30.53 1 16.53 3 23.02 3 32.81 1 20. 14 3 20.66 3 
Health 11.96 4 11 .58 4 14.92 4 7.55 5 15.63 4 11.87 4 10.78 4 
Recreation 1.67 6 1.05 7 1.61 6 2.26 6 1.56 6 2. 16 6 1.50 6 
L ibraries 1.21 7 1.58 6 1.21 7 1.13 7 1.56 6 2. 16 6 0.30 8 
Financial 0.54 8 1.05 7 0.40 8 0.38 8 0.00 7 0.72 7 0.60 7 
Administr<Jtion 
Number of 
Respondents 744 190 248 265 128 278 
334 
*No dist inction is made between operating and capit al expendi tures. 
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Of particular interest in Table 1 is how people of differe nt 
income and education levels rank the expend iture categories. 
Those with incomes below $8,000 indicated social services 
for the aged and poor as the highest expenditure priority. In con-
trast, those with incomes from $8,000 to $12,000 indicated 
public safety as most important and those with incomes above 
1The author w ishes to acknowledge the help from Dr. Paul S.T. Lee 
of the Center who provided the statist ical computations upon which 
analysis was made. Appreciation is also extended to the graduate research 
assistants working at the Center who were responsible for carrying out 
the in terviews. 
2The computed x2 value for the three most frequently mentioned 
most important expenditure categories was 2.5585 (2 d .f.) . The resu lts 
indicate no signif icant difference in ranking of public transportation, 
public safety and soc ial services for the aged and poor (95% confidence). 
3-rhe computed x2 values were 14.1730 (14 d.f.), 24.2163 
(14 d.f.), 30.3734 (14 d.f.). 28.3947 (14 d.f.) and 7.7279 (7 d.f.) by 
area of residence, age, educational level, income and sex. respectively. 
x2 values associated with income and educational levels are significant 
at the 5% significance level. All other x2 values are not significant. 
Center for Applied Urban Research 
University of Nebraska at Omaha 
Box 688 
Omaha, Nebraska 68101 
$12,000 indicated transportation as most important. A similar 
pattern was found by education level s. Those with less than 12 
years of education considered social services for the aged and 
poor to be most important; those with 12 years of education 
considered public safety most important; and those with more 
than 12 years of education placed the greatest importance on 
Conclusions 
Results of this survey should provide local government 
with some positive guidelines fo r allocating revenue shari ng 
funds . The timi ng of th is survey (i.e., the survey was conducted 
after the energy crisis became well publ icized) undoubtedly 
affected the views that people have in particular towards 
environ mental protection and pu bli c transportation expend-
itures. Since attitudes do change there is a definite need for per-
iodic assessments to be made of community opinion toward local 
government expenditure policy. This, in the final analysis, 
shou ld lead to an improvement in both the effectiveness and 
responsiveness of the elected in carrying out the expressed needs 
of the community at large. 
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